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1 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Report on Department of State - JCS
Counter Guerrilla Study Group

1. This memorandum is for the information of the DDCI.
2. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the final report of the temporary Study Group on Counter Guerrilla Warfare, formed pursuant to agreement at the State - JCS meeting on 8 July 1960.
3. As requested by you, I have represented CIA at the discussions of the Group and participated in the drafting of the report. The Group held three formal meetings at the Pentagon Building and, in addition, the Group made a one-day visit to Fort Bragg for the purpose of attending briefings and demonstrations by the Special Forces and the Army Psychological Warfare Center.
4. My personal reactions to the discussions which took place during the course of the meetings are as follows:
 - a. The statement of the problem to be discussed by the Group (see paragraph 1 of the attached study) was developed by the representatives of the Department of State as being their best understanding of the questions raised by Mr. Livingston Merchant at the State - JCS meeting on 8 July 1960. You will note that this statement is a rather limiting one since it concerns itself to the problem of identification of major U. S. departments and agencies interested, and calls for conclusions rather than recommendations on steps required for more effective coordination. The Group as a whole was not willing to make a detailed study, on a country by country basis, of specific steps that should be taken to improve our efforts.

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b. The majority of the Group considered that they constituted solely an informal study group, with no authority for action or even recommendation.

c. Both OSO and ISA of DOD provided a representative to the Group. It was my personal feeling that both of these offices were perfectly content to abide by the restricted interpretation of the Group's charter, in view of the heavy representation, including chairmanship, of the JCS in the Group. You will note that ICA, a major interested agency, was not represented although I questioned their lack of representation on several occasions.

d. Initially, the attention of the Study Group appeared to be almost entirely directed to the military aspects of counter guerrilla warfare and the role that the military should play therein, and with only lip service to the political, economic, and sociological aspects of the problem.

5. Despite the negative thoughts expressed in the preceding paragraph, I believe that the final report, within the limitations to which it has been confined, is a good one and that from the Agency point of view, the following points have been incorporated:

a. A recognition of the importance of the underlying causes for forms of violence such as guerrilla warfare, and the need for an overall U. S. Government approach to these causes as well as to the military aspects. (See conclusions 16 and 17.)

b. The necessity for development of a counter guerrilla doctrine through the coordinated efforts of all interested agencies. (See conclusions 18, 19, 20, and 21.)

c. The necessity for increasing the effectiveness of the country teams in identifying the violence threat and the rapid development of a suitable coordinated program to deal with the threat. (See conclusion 22.)

d. The recognition that in some countries the military will not be in a position to assume counter guerrilla training responsibilities, leaving a gap which is of particular concern to ICA and CIA. (See paragraph 12 of discussion.)

e. The recognition that there must be in being and available to all, a pool of U. S. personnel trained in counter guerrilla warfare doctrine. (See paragraph 15 of discussion.)

6. I have not, as yet, been able to determine what will now be done with the Study, but I assume that it will be included on the agenda of the next State-JCS meeting, probably with the recommendation that it be noted. It does not seem that it will be possible, through the State-JCS mechanism, to come up with the type of study and recommendation for specific action that you desired. I would like to raise the possibility that a more suitable mechanism might be developed through our normal Cold War channels to State and Defense. Namely, General Erskine's office (OSO/OSD) and Mr. Joseph Scott's office (Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs).



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Covert Action Staff

1 Attachment
(Final Report of Study Group)

CA [redacted] bvf
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ABSTRACT

Comments that Study Group on Counter-G/W concerned itself with conclusion (having no authority to make recommendations) about the steps needed to improve U.S. Counter-G/W effort. Feels it may be desirable to select another mechanism to achieve specific recommendations.

(also see: HS/CSG-1746 and 1748)